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Measuring Skill in Games:
Several Approaches Discussed
Marcel Dreef1,2, Peter Borm1 and Ben van der Genugten1
Abstract
An aspect of casino games that in general leads to discussions among both participants and
spectators, is the relative extent to which a player can positively influence his results by
making appropriate strategic choices. This question is closely related to the issue of how to
distinguish between games of skill and games of chance. This is an issue that is interesting
from a juridical point of view too, since in many countries the legitimacy of exploiting a
specific game depends on the category to which it belongs.
This paper summarizes recent developments concerning the measurement of skill in
games. It points out the elements in the definitions that need closer attention, it illustrates
the analysis with examples and it discusses further possibilities.
Keywords: games of skill; games of chance.
JEL code: C72.
1 Introduction
How should one define skill in games? The definition of skill that one finds in the dictionary, is
“the special ability to do something well, especially as gained by learning and practice”. To be
able to use such a broad definition within the context of games, it should be refined. Larkey et al.
(1997) made an attempt and defined skill as “the extent to which a player, properly motivated,
can perform the mandated cognitive and/or physical behaviours for success in a specific game”.
Whereas this definition concerns the player, we are interested in defining the skill level of the
game he participates in. To make the definition of skill applicable to games instead of players,
we modify it such that it expresses how useful the player’s abilities can be for him in the game.
To give a simple example, a perfect memory may not help you in roulette, but in poker it does.
As the articles of Larkey et al. (1997) and Reep et al. (1971) indicate, the notion of skill
can be defined for a large class of games, including various ball games as well as card games
and thinking sports. The current paper concentrates on games for which the outcome can be
expressed in terms of money and in which players can be identified by their strategies. We will
refer to this class of games as casino games.
1CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University.
2Corresponding author. P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: dreef@uvt.nl.
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For casino games, we will define skill as the relative extent to which the outcome of a game is
influenced by the players, compared to the extent to which the outcome depends on the random
elements involved. For random elements one can think of the spinning of a roulette wheel or
the dealing of cards. The larger the influence of the players on the game outcome, the higher
the skill level. Games without random effects, in which only the players have influence on the
outcome, are called pure games of skill, whereas games in which the players cannot affect the
outcome at all are pure games of chance. A game as chess belongs to the first category, while
roulette is intuitively classified as a pure game of chance.1 Although the classification is easy
for these two games, there is a large number of games in which the two sources of influence are
combined and for which the skill level lies somewhere in the grey area between the pure games
of skill and the pure games of chance.
From a juridical perspective, it is important that one can determine for these games in the
grey area if the players are sufficiently influential in a game to classify it as a game of skill or not.
According to the Dutch gaming act, a license is required to exploit a game of chance, whereas
anyone is allowed to offer a game of skill. Similar laws apply in other European countries, as
well as in many states in the USA. It is not difficult to imagine that the proprietor of a game
and the legislator have different opinions about the role of chance in a game. In the first place
judging the role of chance is rather subjective and in the second place the exploitation of games
of chance is a lucrative business, since these games are appealing to a large audience, as Caillois
(1979) argues:
“[Games of chance] promise the lucky player a more modest fortune than he expects,
but the very thought of it is sufficient to dazzle him. Anyone can win. This illusory
expectation encourages the lowly to be more tolerant of a mediocre status that they
have no practical means of improving. Extraordinary luck—a miracle—would be
needed. It is the function of alea to always hold out hope of such a miracle. That
is why games of chance continue to prosper. The state itself even profits from this.
Despite the protest of moralists, it establishes official lotteries, thus benefiting from
a source of revenue that for once is accepted enthusiastically by the public.” (Caillois
1979, p. 115)
The observation that the state itself profits from the appeal of games of chance is also true for
the Netherlands. In practice, the government only grants the required license to the Holland
Casino’s foundation, a state-owned company. The government has both the control and the
profits of this market.
Borm and Van der Genugten (1998, 2001) presented the basics of a method that can be used
to determine whether a game can be classified as a game of skill or not. This method is based
on the Dutch gaming act. The main goal of the current paper is to give an overview of the
1Even pure games of chance are not always classified as such by the participants. The way the game is presented
may lead to misperceived skillful influence over non-controllable events, as Wohl and Enzle (2002) show.
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relevant aspects of this method, but we also discuss some related practical issues. We describe
the general framework in section 2. The sections 3 to 5 are devoted to the description of the
details of the analysis.
Whereas the skill measure is meant to determine the skill involved in the game as a whole, it is
in general interesting to study the skill level of individual players as well. In sports, for example,
player skill levels can be recognized in the form of handicaps assigned to golf players. Within
the class of games we focus on, one can think of the ratings of chess players that determine their
position on the world ranking. We will spend section 6 on some discussion around this topic.
In section 7 the concepts discussed in sections 2 to 6 will be illustrated by means of a two-
person poker game. In this example, which forms an addition to the study of Dreef et al. (2003),
we will describe and explain the aspects that are relevant for the skill analysis. Section 8 sketches
some possibilities to investigate the skill level of games using empirical data.
2 A Relative Measure
The method that Borm and Van der Genugten (1998, 2001) developed is based on the following
important passage in the Dutch gaming act, which gives a qualitative characterization of the
class of games for which a license is needed:
[. . . ] it is not allowed to: exploit games with monetary prizes if the participants
in general do not have a dominant influence on the winning possibilities, unless in
compliance to this act, a license is granted [. . . ].
All games that satisfy this definition, are called games of chance. By definition, all other
games are referred to as games of skill. Borm and Van der Genugten (1998) give the following
three qualitative requirements which summarize the basic ideas underlying the Dutch legislation
concerning the exploitation of games with chance elements.
(R1) The legislation applies exclusively to situations which involve the exploitation of games
with monetary prizes.
(R2) The skill of a player should be measured as his average game result in the long run, i.e.
in terms of expected result. For a game of skill it is necessary that these expected results
vary among players.
(R3) The fact that there is a difference between players with respect to their expected payoffs,
does not immediately imply that the underlying game is a game of skill. For a game of
skill it is sufficient that the chance elements involved do not prohibit these differences to
be substantial.
Using these three requirements, we are ready to give the general framework of the relative skill
measure for one-person games. To take into account requirement (R1), we restrict attention
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in our analysis to games in which the “game-result” of a player can be expressed in terms of
money.
The difference in player results that is required by (R2), can be measured by what is called
the learning effect in the game. According to (R3), it is not the absolute size of the learning
effect that determines the skill level of a game, but the relative size of this effect in relation to
the restrictive possibilities within the game set by the chance elements. Therefore, one should
also quantify this restrictive influence of the random moves. One can do this by investigating
the possibilities of the players in the absence of these moves. This restriction by the chance




learning effect + random effect
. (1)
Formal definitions of the learning effect and the random effect will follow later, but let us
already note that these concepts will be defined such that the corresponding numbers will be be
nonnegative. This implies that
(pure games of chance) 0 ≤ skill level ≤ 1 (pure games of skill).
Games, in which the random effect dominates the learning effect, will have a low skill level. For
games in which the learning effect dominates, the skill level will be high. For completeness, we
note that a game for which both the learning effect and the random effect are equal to zero, has
a skill level of zero by definition; in games of practical importance this situation does not occur.
The following sections will make clear how the concepts described above are formally defined
in order to obtain a way to objectively determine the skill level of a specific casino game and to
compare games with each other.
3 Player types
The jurisprudence regarding the Dutch gaming act has indicated how one should interpret the
framework that we presented in the previous section in practice. Both the learning effect and the
random effect should be measured by comparing two different types of players. For more details
concerning the gaming act and the corresponding jurisprudence we refer to Van der Genugten
and Borm (1994). In this section we will describe and briefly discuss the three player types that
are used in the analysis. We will successively characterize beginners, optimal players and fictive
players.
3.1 Beginners
The first of the three player types that are interesting, is the beginner. A beginner is a player
who has only just familiarized himself with the rules of the game and plays a relatively simple,
naive strategy.
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It is not always easy to determine the behaviour of beginners in a specific game. In general,
we distinguish three ways to do this. First of all, in games with a structure like Roulette,
we think it is reasonable to assume that a beginner chooses randomly between all available
strategies. The category of games for which this method is suitable, however, is not the most
interesting category with respect to the analysis of skill. Secondly, the behaviour of beginners
can be determined by means of observation. This method has two disadvantages. In the first
place the collection of data could be a costly affair and in the second place this approach is
only possible for games that are exploited in practice. The third way to gain insight applies to
games that are not (yet) exploited in practice: have the rules and structure of the game studied
by a gambling expert. This person can use his expert knowledge to formulate an idea for the
beginner’s strategy that satisfies a the general idea of how people act in games they are not
really familiar with. In Kadane (1986) one can find a nice practical example of this process,
including some discussion on the rules of thumb that might be used.
3.2 Optimal Players
The second class of players that is important for the analysis of skill is formed by the optimal
players. These players completely mastered the rules of the game and exploit their knowledge
maximally in their strategies. Optimal players can be seen as the refined representatives of the
more natural category of advanced players. Advanced players are observed in practice in any
skillful casino game that has been around for a longer period. They play a smart strategy which
yields them game results close to the theoretical maximum.
The payoffs of the optimal player can be analytically computed or approximated by means
of simulation. In a one-person game the optimal player just solves the underlying maximization
problem, while optimal players in a two-person zero-sum game play minimax strategies.
3.3 Fictive Players
The third and last category of players that we need is a fictive one, consisting of players who know
in advance the realization of the random elements in the game. Here we distinguish between
two kinds of random elements. In the first place, a fictive player is informed about the outcome
of the external chance moves. External chance moves are for example the dealing of the cards
and the spinning of the roulette wheel. The other sort of chance move a player can face, occurs
in more-person games and is caused by his opponents. Players generate uncertainty for their
opponents by playing mixed strategies. We call these random elements internal chance moves.
Besides his information regarding the external chance moves, a fictive player can be informed
about these internal chance moves of the other players too.
To be complete, we want to mention a second type of fictive player, the fictive worst player.
This is a player who has the same information as a (normal) fictive player, but deliberately uses
this information to reach a game result as bad as possible. The fictive worst player was used
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in an earlier version of the skill measure (see Van der Genugten and Borm (1994)) to create a
reference point. The role that fictive players can play in analyzing the role of information in
games, is currently studied by Dreef and Borm (2003).
3.4 The Use of the Player Types in the Skill Measure
To conclude this section, we will see how the player types that were defined in the previous
three subsections fit in the framework that was set up in section 2. In formula (1), we have seen
that the two deciding factors of the relative skill measure are the learning effect and the random
effect. The learning effect is defined as the difference between the result of the optimal player
and the beginner, while the random effect is defined as the difference in game result between
the fictive player and the optimal player.
Regarding the random effect, one has to be careful. Two different definitions are used.
Borm and Van der Genugten (1998, 2001) use the game results of the fictive player that is only
informed about the external chance moves, whereas Dreef et al. (2001) compare the result of
the optimal player to the result of the fictive player to whom also the realization of the internal
chance moves is revealed.
A player type that was not mentioned above, but which certainly is of theoretical interest
when one studies a casino game, is the average player. When compared to the results of the
player types we just introduced, the results of the average casino visitor of a casino in a specific
game could be helpful when determining the skill level of this game. Borm and Van der Genugten
(1998) indeed use the average player in the development of the measure, but they also explain
why this type does not make it into the final model: it is often hard, if not impossible, to reach
agreement about the strategic behaviour of the average player.
4 Measuring the game result
In the preceding sections we have spoken about the learning effect, the random effect and the
three player types whose game results form the basis for the numbers. However, we did not
yet define exactly what determines a player’s game result. As Borm and Van der Genugten
(1998) already suggested, the two numbers that can be taken into account are the payoff of the
player and the stakes (bets) that are needed to obtain this payoff. The two sensible definitions
of a player’s game result that one can come up with, using these numbers, are (net) gains and
returns:
gains = payoffs− stakes returns =
gains
stakes
Which of the two definitions should we use as an indication for the strength of the player types?
One should be careful when making a selection. Implicitly, the choice of measurement implies
an assumption about the goals of the players in a game. In general, a player’s strategy will
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depend on his focus: the strategy that maximizes the expected net gain is not the same as the
strategy optimizing the expected returns. In practice, in most games the players seem to aim
for the highest possible gains.
However, there are games in which expected gains do not form an appropriate strategy
evaluation. A practical example is the game of roulette. Intuitively, roulette is a pure game of
chance. A player cannot influence his expected results by varying his strategy; i.e., if results are
measured in terms of expected returns. Of course, by betting twice as much, one can double
the expected gains, but the expected returns are not affected. If we define the strategy of a
beginner, we have to make assumptions about the bet size he uses. For roulette we know that
the optimal player will bet the minimum, since the expectation of his gains is negative. If we
assume that a beginner plays a strategy that assigns a positive probability to a bet larger than
the minimum, his expected gains will be smaller than those of the optimal player and, as a
result, roulette will have a positive learning effect. This positive learning effect will not occur if
we use expected returns to evaluate the player’s strategies.2
This solution has some disadvantages. In the first place, the linearity of the game results
is lost. This makes computations more difficult. Besides that, in more-person games we have
the complication that zero-sum games are turned into games of which the payoffs are not zero-
sum. There is an alternative that may seem to use the best of two worlds: one could determine
the strategies in the linear, zero-sum environment and consequently compute the corresponding
expected returns and use these in the relative skill measure. This possibility has a theoretical
drawback. The expected gains of a beginner will be smaller than or equal to the expected gains
of an optimal player and an optimal player will never have expected gains that are strictly higher
than the expected gains of the fictive player. However, this logical ordering is not necessarily
preserved when when we look at the expected returns that correspond to the strategies of the
three player types. As a result, for some games this may lead to the undesirable result that the
skill level lies outside the interval [0, 1].
Another option is to model the bet size as a pre-game decision of how many unit games to
play at the same time, where the unit game is the game with fixed, normalized bet size. For
example, in roulette, deciding to bet 10 euro on black, is equivalent to deciding to play 10 games
of “unit roulette” simultaneously, in which you bet 1 euro (the fixed, normalized bet size) on
black. A similar decomposition is possible for instance for trajectory games like golden-ten, but
also for blackjack played with an automatic card-shuffling machine. We think that what one
really wants to know if one asks for the skill involved in a game, is the skill level of the unit game.
When playing multiple instances of a game simultaneously, one has the same relative influence
on the expected result as in one instance of the game. In defining our three player types, we
2To be complete, we note that there is a difference in expected returns between simple strategies (e.g. red
or black, even or odd) and non-simple strategies (e.g. single numbers). However, the learning effect will always
be small compared to the random effect that is caused by the fictive player who always bets maximally on the
correct number.
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can therefore restrict ourselves to defining the strategies they use in the unit game. Measuring
expected gains is then equivalent to measuring expected returns and the ordering problem will
not occur anymore.
We can use this last way of modelling if the following conditions are satisfied:
(C1) the size of the bet that is chosen does not affect the course of the game;
(C2) at the moment the bet size is chosen, no information about the outcome of the chance
move is available yet;
(C3) the structure of the payoff function is such that the expected gains with a bet size b are
of the form cb, where c is a positive constant.
Within the class of one-person games we find games that satisfy the three conditions above.
However, when we move from one-person games to more-person games, the first of the conditions
at the end of the previous section is no longer satisfied. E.g., in a two-person game where the
players do not move simultaneously and where the second player is informed about the amount
bet by the first player, different bets of the first player lead to different information sets of the
second player. This type of bet of the first player is an example of a strategic bet, whereas the
bets that satisfy the conditions above are called non-strategic bets. In a game that contains
strategic bets a reduction to the analysis of a unit game is not possible. This is not a problem,
since for more-person games there is no need for an alternative definition of player strength;
expected gains can serve this purpose very well. The only assumption we have to make in the
skill analysis of more-person games, is that all participants have sufficiently large resources. In
this way, buying out an opponent by means of extraordinarily large (bluffing) bets is not possible
and, as a consequence, the analysis only takes into account the “real” strategic features of the
game.
5 Definition of opposition
The framework for the skill analysis that was introduced in section 2 is not only applicable to
one-person games, but also to games with more players. Although in one-person games the game
results for the three player types are unambiguously determined by the strategies chosen by the
players, in more-person games the payoff of a player clearly depends on the way the opposition
acts.
In the analysis of skill two approaches are used to model the opposition of the beginners,
the optimal players and the fictive players. Borm and Van der Genugten (1998, 2001) compute
what would be (jointly) optimal for the opponent(s) against an optimal player. Next, the three
player types are evaluated against this resulting optimal (joint) strategy of the opposition. Dreef
et al. (2001) use a different approach. They assume that the opponents play in such a way that
they offer maximal opposition to the player type under consideration.
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Whereas this direct opposition is clear in two-person zero-sum games, in games with more
participants it is not. In a game with at three or more players the mutual competition is of
a more indirect and complex nature. Although money still is only reallocated in an n-person
zero-sum game, two particular participants cannot be viewed as direct adversaries in the sense
that they should (or could) act such that they oppose each other as strongly as possible. The
solution that is chosen for this problem in the skill analysis is the following. In an n-person
game the n−1 opponents of a specific player are assumed to act as one. In terms of cooperative
game theory these n− 1 players form a coalition. By defining the payoff of the coalition as the
sum of the individual member payoffs, we obtain a two-person zero-sum game again. Thus, we
can find the optimal opposition in the familiar way.
However, one should be careful following this approach of creating large coalitions to play
against the player (type) one wants to evaluate. Especially, as the number of participants grows,
this becomes less realistic. How realistic is the cooperation of six players in a Seven Card Stud
Poker game between seven players? Perhaps an alternative option is to investigate all possible
divisions of the player set into two coalitions. One-person coalitions are part of the model then,
but they do not get as much weight as they do in the current model. Such a method would take
into account the fact that the coalitions that might form in practice might not even be constant
during one instance of the game.
6 Player skill vs game skill
Before we turn to an example in section 7, we would like to spend a few words on the relation
between player skill and game skill. As the first paragraph of the introduction already indicates,
there is a distinction between the two concepts. The previously mentioned article of Larkey et al.
(1997) focusses on skill differences between players. Their ideas are presented by means of a large
example, in which twelve different player types play against each other a simplified version of
stud poker. Each player is described by means of a complete, algorithmically described strategy.
Skill differences are created by carefully varying certain characteristics over the twelve strategies.
These players play a complete tournament and in the end the table with game results is used to
draw conclusions about skill differences between players and about different types of skill that
can be useful in the poker game. Their results make clear that a player’s performance strongly
depends on the opposition he faces. They can, given the opposition, distinguish between more
and less skillful player types. However, it is not directly clear how one could use their results to
say something about the skill level of the poker variant itself.
How does this work in our skill analysis? In section 2 we defined the notions of learning
effect and random effect that are used to compute the relative influence of a player on the game
result. If we consider a one-person game, we can just fill in these numbers in formula (1) to
find the skill level of the game. For a one-person game, the relative influence that the player
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has determines the skill level of the game. For more-person games some more work is required.
For each player (or player role) in the game we can compute the learning effect and the random
effect. Next, there are two ways to use these numbers to draw conclusions about the skill level
of the game. In the first place, we can compute the overall learning effect and random effect by
taking the average over the, say, n players and use the results in formula (1) to compute the
skill level. This is the approach followed by both Borm and Van der Genugten (1998, 2001) and
Dreef et al. (2001). An alternative would be to compute the relative skill level for each player
separately and take the average over these n numbers to find the skill of the game as a whole.
Both methods seem to make sense, but in general they do not yield the same results.
We abbreviate the learning effect by LE and the random effect by RE, write RS for relative
skill level and use a subscript to indicate if we speak about a player or the game itself, then we












i=1 (LEplayer i +REplayer i)
. (2)












LEplayer i +REplayer i
. (3)
An example in which the difference between two methods is illustrated, is presented by Black
Jack. In principle, Black Jack is a one-person game. Although the dealer draws cards too, he has
a dummy strategy and cannot make any strategic decisions. For this one-person game, we can
compute the learning effect LEBJ, the random effect REBJ and the resulting skill level RSBJ.
Next, we modify the game such that you can play it with two players. In each play one of the
participants takes the role of the bank. Having the role of the bank, a player has no choices;
he still has to play the dummy strategy. Therefore, a beginner and a fictive player will have
the same expected game result as an optimal player. As a result, the learning effect, and thus
the relative skill of this player role are zero. For the other player we already have the numbers:
LEBJ, REBJ and RSBJ. If we use formula (2) to determine the skill level of the new game, we
find that it is equal to the skill level of “standard” Black Jack, whereas the skill level turns out
to be halved according to formula (3). Which of the two is better, depends on the context. It
may for example depend on the type of games one wants to compare a game with and on what
information regarding skill is available for the other games.
7 An Example
In this section we want to illustrate the use of the method for measuring skill. We will work
out the analysis for a simple poker game for two players. This game, to which we will refer as
minipoker, is studied in detail in Dreef et al. (2003). The part of that paper that discusses skill
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focusses on the measure that was defined by Borm and Van der Genugten (1998). We will use
the abbreviation RS1998 for this skill measure. Here, we will pay more attention to the skill
measuring approach of Dreef et al. (2001), shortly written as RS2001. We will use some of the
results derived by Dreef et al. (2003) and include their results for comparison. We use expected
gains as the definition of game results.
7.1 Game Description
The formal description of the rules of minipoker is as follows. To begin the game, both players








possible hand combinations that can be dealt in a general poker game, the hands are assumed
to be real numbers, drawn from the unit interval. Player 1’s hand is the value u of a continuous
random variable U and player 2’s hand is the value v of a continuous random variable V . U and
V are independently, identically distributed on [0, 1] according to the cumulative distribution
function F : [0, 1]→ R+. The function f : [0, 1]→ R++ denotes the probability density function
for this distribution and is assumed to be positive and continuous on its domain. For the skill
analysis, we will consider the case where F and f correspond to the uniform distribution on
[0, 1].
After seeing his hand, player 1 can choose between passing and betting. If he passes, a
showdown follows immediately. In the showdown, the players compare their hands and the
player with the highest hand wins the pot. Betting means adding an extra amount 1 to the
stakes. After a bet by player 1, player 2 can decide to fold or to call. If he folds, he loses his
ante of 1 to player 1. To call, player 2 must put an extra amount 1 in the pot. In that case a
showdown follows and the player with the better hand takes the pot.
Figure 1 displays our poker model in extensive form. Two possible hands, u1 and u2, for
player 1 are shown. To keep the picture clear, player 2 is shown receiving his hand v after player
1 has decided how to bet. From the description above and the payoffs in the picture, it is clear
that the hand v is chosen such that it satisfies u1 < v < u2. Since the payoffs are zero-sum, it
suffices to give the payoff for player 1.
7.2 Optimal Play
Dreef et al. (2003) derive that the optimal strategy for player 1, stated in terms of probabilities,
is
Pr{bet with hand u} = p̃(u) =
{
1 if u ≤ 1
10




and that it is optimal for player 2 to play
Pr{call with hand v} = q̃(v) =
{
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Figure 1: The extensive form of two-person minipoker (u1 < v < u2).
So player 1 should bet with high hands, bluff with very low hands and pass with intermediate
hand values. Player 2 has one boundary hand value. If he has a hand that is better he calls,
otherwise he folds. The value of the game is 1
10
. This is the first result we need for the skill
analysis: if player 1 plays optimally and he faces optimal opposition, then his expected payoff
will be equal to the game value. In both RS1998 and RS2001 we use this number as the game
result for the optimal player 1. Obviously, the payoff for player 2 as an optimal player is equal
to − 1
10
. We will collect all results in Table 1 in section 7.5.
7.3 Beginners
Next, we are interested in the behaviour of players who play this game for the first time, just after
the rules are explained to them. We have to make assumptions about their strategic choices.
Dreef et al. (2003) present the following reasoning. Perhaps beginners have heard about the
famous video poker variant “Jacks or Better”. In this game, as the name suggests, only hands
with a pair of Jacks, Queens, Kings or Aces (and all hands from higher classes) have value for
the player. As a result, naive players may be betting or calling with exactly these hands. Even
if they do not know this game, this border seems to be a reasonable one. After all, poker players
tend to like hands that look fancy; any hand with at least a pair of images surely satisfies this
condition of prettiness.
What does this reasoning mean for the strategies of the beginners? Player 1 bets only if his
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hand is at least (J, J, 4, 3, 2). For each player the total probability of receiving a hand up to
(J, J, 4, 3, 2) is 1189
1498
≈ 0.7937.3 So we can formulate the strategy for player 1 as a beginner as
p0(u) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ u ≤ 0.7937
1 if 0.7937 < u ≤ 1,
while the beginner’s strategy for player 2 can be formulated as
q0(v) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ v ≤ 0.7937
1 if 0.7937 < v ≤ 1.
Let Ui(p, q) denote the expected gains for player i if player 1 plays strategy p and player 2 plays
strategy q. Then we can write down the expected payoff of the beginners against opponents








These numbers are the game results of the beginners in RS1998. For the RS2001 analysis, we
need to do some more work. Given the strategies for the beginners (p0 and q0), we have to
find out what is the optimal response of the opponent. We will describe in detail how player 2
determines what will be his best strategy. For each possible value v of his hand, he has to decide
whether calling or folding is optimal against p0. Figure 2 displays the payoff for player 2 for
each of his two actions, given a hand combination (u, v). The P and B under the horizontal
axis indicate for which values of u player 1 passes or bets according to strategy p0, while b is
the boundary value 0.7937 in player 1’s beginner’s strategy p0.
For each of the four marked intervals along the vertical axes (α, β, γ and δ) we can compute
the expected payoff for player 2 for a specific hand value v.
Interval Expected payoff for player 2 with a hand v
α v − (1− v) = 2v − 1
β b− (1− b) = 2b− 1
γ v − (b− v)− 2(1− b) = 2v − 2 + b
δ b+ 2(v − b)− 2(1− v) = 4v − 2− b
Player 2 should base his decisions on the numbers in this table. He has to compare the expected
result for each v in α with the expectations for the same v in γ. If for a certain v the result in
α is better than the result in γ, player 2 should fold. Otherwise he should call with this hand
value. A similar comparison he should make between β and δ. We find that the optimal reply
against a player playing p0 is
Pr{call with hand v} = q̃0(v) =
{
0 if v ≤ 0.8453,
1 otherwise.
3For details about probabilities in poker we refer to Dreef et al. (2003).
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Figure 2: Expected payoffs for player 2 against beginner’s strategy p0 of player 1.
The boundary value of 0.8453 is rounded. We can now compute the resulting expected gains
of player 1. A similar analysis leads to the payoff for player 2 when he acts as a beginner in
RS2001. The results are
U1(p0, q̃0) ≈ −0.0053 and U2(p̃0, q0) ≈ −0.4875.
7.4 Fictive Players
In the current section we will compute the expected payoffs of fictive players in minipoker.
Fictive players have more information than normal players. According to the assumptions used
for RS1998, they know the outcome of the chance move in the game and they can use this
information in their strategies. For minipoker this means that the fictive player can base his
actions on his own hand, but also on the hand of his opponent. Given the fact that he plays
against a player who uses the minimax strategy, he can decide what will be his best action for
any hand combination (u, v). We call the resulting strategy p1998f . Dreef et al. (2003) already
showed that the expected gains of player 1 are equal to
U1(p
1998











We also want to compute the expected gains of the fictive players under the assumptions of
RS2001. Under these assumptions, fictive players are also informed about the outcome of any
14
randomization caused by their opponents. Therefore, when we determine optimal play for an
opponent, we have to consider pure strategies only; randomizing is useless against such a fictive
player.
Let us first focus at player 1 as a fictive player. What is the best thing player 2 can do if
player 1 knows, besides the value u of his own hand, the value v of player 2’s hand too? Suppose
player 1 has bet. If player 2 calls with a specific value v, he will get −(−v+ 2(1− v)) = 3v − 2.
For folding he will get −1 on any hand value v. Therefore, it is optimal for player 2 to fold if
v < 1
3
and to call otherwise. Then player 1 should always bet and his expected gains are
U1(p
2001




To see what the expected gains of player 2 as a fictive player are, consider what player 1 gets for
betting and what he gets for passing, both with a hand of value u. Whereas betting will yield
him a dollar if he has the more valuable hand, he will have to pay 2 dollars if his opponent has
the better hand. Passing also gives him a win of one dollar if u > v, but with this action he will
only lose one dollar in case his opponent has the better hand. Passing, therefore, is optimal for




f ) = 0.
7.5 Results of the Skill Analysis for Minipoker
We have computed all relevant numbers to complete our skill analysis. Table 1 gives an overview.
We observe the following things in Table 1. The expected payoffs of the beginners and the fictive
RS1998 RS2001
Player 1 Player 2 Game Player 1 Player 2 Game
Beginner 0.0812 -0.1176 -0.0182 -0.0053 -0.4875 -0.2464
Optimal 0.1000 -0.1000 0.0000 0.1000 -0.1000 0.0000
Fictive 0.3400 0.1400 0.2400 0.3333 0.0000 0.1667
LE 0.0188 0.0176 0.0182 0.1053 0.3875 0.2464
RE 0.2400 0.2400 0.2400 0.2333 0.1000 0.1667
RS 0.0726 0.0682 0.0704 0.3110 0.7949 0.5965
Table 1: Results of the skill analysis.
players are lower in the RS2001 model. This is what we expected, since their opponents now
try to make life as hard as possible for them. The results for optimal players are the same in
both models. Therefore the learning effect in the RS2001 model is larger and the random effect
is smaller than in the RS1998 analysis. This combination of effects leads to a higher skill level
for the game. This should be a warning: never base a comparison between the skill levels of two
games on two different skill measures.
15






RSplayer 2, as we
already indicated in section 6. If we compare the skill of both players within the RS2001 model,
we see that the skill of player 2 is relatively high. This can be explained by the beginner’s
strategy of player 2. This is a relatively dumb one, in the sense that player 1 can really profit
from his mistakes. So against a player who gives maximal opposition, the beginner in the role
of player 2 does relatively bad.
8 Determining the Skill Level Using Empirical Data
In the foregoing we have described, discussed and illustrated general aspects concerning a skill
analysis of casino games. In this last section we want to indicate briefly what could be the role
of empirical data in determining the skill level of a game.
In the first place one could think about collecting player results in a casino and using the
resulting numbers as input for the skill measure that was given in formula (1). However, one
should be careful. For a one-person game, we can imagine that it is possible to collect information
about the game results of beginners and advanced players, or otherwise about the average player
that was mentioned in section 3.4. The expected results for the fictive player should still be
computed, since this is a theoretical player type.
For more-person games, life is more difficult. Of course, it is still possible to observe and
collect the game results of beginners and advanced players. However, one should now know
exactly against what kind of opposition the results in this data set are obtained. In an ideal
situation one should obtain detailed information about the decisions made by all players. After
all, the results for the fictive players still have to be computed and for these computations
information about the opposition is needed.
If information is not available in so much detail, one could come up with simple rules of
thumb to deduce an idea the skill level of a game out of the data. For example, suppose one has
a collection of game results and one knows which part of the data corresponds to beginners and
which to advanced players. Then one could apply a sort of analysis of variance. A difference
in mean between the two groups indicates that there is some skill involved. A large spread or
variance within each of the two parts of the data separately might point out that there is a
significant random effect involved. Clearly, the details for such an analysis have to be worked
out, but it might prove worthwhile and certainly deserves attention in the future.
As a final remark we wish to mention the possibility designing experiments to collect data
for a specific game. Yu and Cowan (1995) give an example of a statistical model using duplicate
tournaments to deduce information about the luck-skill balance in the game. They argue,
however, that it is difficult to separately estimate effects of luck and effects of a better or worse
execution of strategies by a player.
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